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I. INTRODUCTION

Walter Smith, a 33-year-old who was mentally handicapped, died
tragically while living at a Pennsylvania private group home called
Greenwich Home for Children, Inc. 1 This home is a Community
Rehabilitation Residential Service where mentally handicapped people
live and are cared for by professionals. Walter suffered from an eating
disorder known as food shoveling, where he would shove excessive
quantities of food in his mouth at one time. In addition, he suffered from
a hypoactive gag reflex which made him abnormally susceptible to
choking. For these reasons, those caring for him needed to take special
precautions to prevent him from choking. The professionals at Greenwich
were fully aware of his condition and were trained to feed him
appropriately. On the day of his death, Walter had been given two peanut
butter sandwiches cut up into tiny pieces. While his supervisor had
stepped out, he had shoved all of the pieces into his mouth and began
choking. Despite efforts to save him, Walter choked to death on the
sandwich.
Walter’s parents brought a negligence claim and sought
compensatory and punitive damages. Imagine a scenario where the jury
had returned a verdict of gross negligence, but had awarded damages
consistent with simple negligence rather than with gross negligence. After
the verdict was read, the jury was dismissed, and all jurors left the
courtroom before the judge or counsel realized the inconsistent verdict.
In the scenario where a jury is dismissed after reaching an
inconsistent verdict, a federal judge has newly adopted authority. In the
* Maria T. Ciccolini is a J.D. Candidate at The University of Akron School of Law, graduating in
May 2018. The author would like to especially thank Professor Camilla Hrdy for her helpful guidance
and support in the writing of this Article.
1. This anecdote has some facts taken from Fialkowski v. Greenwich Home for Children,
Inc., 921 F.2d 4591 (3d Cir. 1990). Other facts are hypothetical and made up by the author. This
anecdote will continue in Section III of this Article.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss3/11

2

Ciccolini: When to Recall Discharged Juries

2017]

WHEN TO RECALL DISCHARGED JURIES

921

case of Dietz v. Bouldin, the United States Supreme Court decided that
federal judges can recall juries to amend the error. 2 The judge must be
certain there is no prejudice to the jury, however, and address four factors
laid out by the Court. 3
This Article will explore those four factors and will ultimately argue
for a bright-line rule that balances the risk of prejudice with the burdens
of granting a whole new trial. This proposed rule is consistent with the
long-standing principle of not recalling a jury once discharged because
the risk of prejudice is far too high once the jury disperses and resumes
their everyday lives. The proposed rule tightens the wide-latitude of
discretion afforded to federal judges by the Dietz decision. Judicial
discretion is of course inevitable, but its effects can be dangerous if not
restrained. 4
Section II of this Article will discuss the long-standing principle
stemming from the English common law that judges should not recall a
jury once it has been discharged. It will also explain how this concept
translated similarly into the American judicial system, and it will provide
substance on how the federal circuit courts have handled this issue in
varying ways leading up to Dietz. Section III of this Article will discuss
the Dietz test, and it will also describe the petitioner’s argument on appeal
about why the jury should not have been recalled in Dietz. This section
will also set forth the main argument that the Supreme Court test is
insufficient to ensure that claimants before the court are granted a fair
outcome. I will analyze the factors of the Dietz test and apply them to a
hypothetical case. The hypothetical will show that there is too great of a
chance that the jury will be prejudiced and that the judge would
nevertheless use that original jury to amend the verdict. In Section IV a
new test is then introduced: a bright-line rule that is more fair and keeps
the sanctity of the jury. It balances the potential risk of prejudice with the
likely burdens that come with starting a whole new trial with an entirely
new jury. The presumption should be that a new trial will be granted
unless the risk of prejudice is less than the burden of starting a new trial.
Additionally, to assess prejudice, judges should use a jury questionnaire
to help determine if there was any prejudice. My proposed test will also
be applied to the same hypothetical case and indicate how it is a better test
for determining prejudice to prevent partial juries. In this section the issue
2. 136 S. Ct. 1885 (2016).
3. Id.
4. Sarah M.R. Cravens, Judging Discretion: Contexts for Understanding the Role of
Judgement, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 947, 948 (2010) (“Discretion . . . can be a slippery and nebulous
concept.”).
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of post-trial motions and objections will also be discussed with the
implications of Dietz. Section V of this Article will summarize the main
points and encourage the Court to adopt a stricter test than what is set forth
in Dietz.
II. THE HISTORIC PRINCIPLE OF NOT RECALLING DISCHARGED JURIES
American jurisprudence relied on the precedent set by the 1600s
English common law that prohibits dismissed juries from being recalled
to amend their verdict. 5 In a case questioning the re-summoning of a
dismissed jury, the English court held that the same jury cannot be called
back to try the same case or same issue in the case. 6 The English courts
also originated the concept of sequestering jurors during their
deliberations so that they could be kept free of prejudice. 7 It was such a
critical component of conducting fair trials that if the judge was leaving
town and the jury had not yet reached a verdict, the jurors would have to
stay together and be taken around with the judge to the other circuits until
they had finished deliberating. 8
A.

The Longstanding Principle

Subsequently, the first American courts to deal with these issues
expressed the same concerns about alleviating prejudice from juries and
prohibiting a recall post-discharge. For example, in 1822, the Maine
Supreme Court held that only a clerical mistake in the verdict could be
amended by the court itself. 9 However, if the mistake was more
substantial, for instance if the wrong party was awarded damages or if the
wrong sum was indicated, the only option for the court was to set aside
the verdict and call for a new trial. 10 The option of re-calling the jury was
never discussed. 11 This was similar to an 1842 Ohio Supreme Court
decision where the trial court allowed a recall of a discharged jury because

5. Brief for Petitioner at *27, Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885 (2016) (No. 15458), 2016 WL
792077 (citing Loveday’s Case, 8 Coke Rep. 65b, 65b, 77 Eng. Rep. 573 (1608)) [hereinafter Brief
for Petitioner].
6. Id.
7. BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 375-76 (Wayne Morrison ed.,
2001) (1768). See also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5 (citing Commonwealth v. M’Caul, 3 Va. (1
Va. Cas.) 271, 305-06 (Va. 1812)) (granting a new trial where strict segregation was not maintained
even though “there might be and probably was no tampering with any juryman in this case”).
8. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at *28.
9. Little v. Larrabee, 2 Me. 37, 37 (1822).
10. Id. at 39-40.
11. Id. at 37-41.
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the jury had written a verdict on only one of the two counts. 12 Overruling
the trial court decision, the court denied the recall of the same jury because
it would “jeopardize the jealous guards with which the law has surrounded
jurors, to insure the pure administration of justice, and to protect the
citizen.” 13 The court articulated that there could be no case where the jury
could make an amendment to the verdict once the jury has been
discharged. 14 The same decision was made in 1836 by the General Court
of Virginia when a new trial was granted when a mistake was made,
despite the fact that only one juror had physically left the courthouse. 15 In
fact, the juror had only gone about 50 yards or so and was even
accompanied by a sheriff. 16 Even then, the court would not approve of the
verdict being changed by that original discharged jury. 17
The judiciary has also dealt with the issue in the modern era, and
several jurisdictions have ruled in favor of not reconvening a discharged
jury. 18 The Supreme Court of Arkansas ruled on this issue in 2002 when
it overturned a trial court’s decision to recall a discharged jury. 19 The
state’s highest court held that jurors may only amend verdicts prior to
being discharged because at that time they still have the power to do so
and are not susceptible to any prejudice. 20 Though the foreman said the
jurors had only spoken to each other (and not anyone else) once
discharged, the court reasoned that the jury could not be reconvened. 21
Only when jurors have stayed as a single body in the presence of the
courtroom—where not even the appearance of taint can occur—should
the jury be reconvened. 22
12. Sargent v. State, 11 Ohio 472-74 (1842).
13. Id. at 474.
14. Id.
15. Mills v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. 751, 751-52 (1836).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 752. The discharged jurors actually came back and amended the verdict, but then the
judge ruled to set aside the verdict.
18. Moreover, in 2012 the Administration Office of the United States Courts published a
handbook for trial jurors in the district courts to use for their own reference. It tells the jurors that
once they are dismissed by the judge they can resume their normal daily lives. There is nothing in the
handbook that discusses the ability of a federal judge to reassemble the jury after being told they are
free to go. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, HANDBOOK FOR TRIAL JURORS SERVING IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, 9-14 (2012), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/trialhandbook.pdf [http://perma.cc/WEL7-USZR]
19. Spears v. Mills, 69 S.W.3d 407, 413 (Ark. 2002). The jury had initially awarded $0 in
damages, and then came back and awarded $5,900. Id. at 410.
20. Id. at 413.
21. Id.
22. Id. See Nails v. S&R, Inc., 639 A.2d 660, 667 (Md. 1994) (holding that the jury in a civil
case could only amend the verdict due to an inconsistency, ambiguity, or incompleteness up until the
jury is discharged); see also Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stuart, 395 So. 2d 980, 988 (Ala. 1981)
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Similarly, a few years after Spears, the Supreme Court of Montana
held that a Montana trial court erred in reconvening a dismissed jury
because two of the jurors had ex parte communication about the verdict
with counsel. 23 The court further reasoned that juries are to be supervised,
and that once the jury is dismissed, it is left to its own devices and is too
free to be brought back and change a verdict. 24
Most importantly, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictate how
and when the jury can be instructed, and nowhere in the rules does it allow
a recall of a discharged jury. 25 On the contrary, the rules state that “the
court may instruct the jury at any time before the jury is discharged.” 26
The plain language indicates that juries cannot be instructed and are to
return to being ordinary citizens once dismissed by the judge. 27
B.

The Circuit Split Preceding Dietz v. Bouldin

Prior to the Supreme Court decision, there was a slight circuit split
on the issue of whether judges had the authority to reconvene a discharged
jury. 28 The majority of the circuit courts that had ruled on the decision
held that judges may recall discharged jurors if, in the totality of the
circumstances, they were not subjected to outside influences.29 The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals was the first circuit court to rule on this issue. 30
(holding that the trial court erred in recalling the jury because the jury was discharged and the trial
judge had retired to its chambers so was not in control of the courtroom when counselor spoke with a
juror and realized the jury rendered the wrong verdict); People v. Hendricks, 737 P.2d 1350, 1352
(Cal. 1987). In People v. Hendricks, the court held that it was gross error for the lower court to recall
a jury that had been discharged for over five months, whether properly or not, because the court had
lost control over that jury. The court cited People v. Grider, 246 Cal. App. 2d 149 (1966) another case
where the court had lost control over a jury, only this time the jury had been out of the jury box for a
mere nine minutes. Hendricks, 737 P.2d at 1359.
23. Pumphrey v. Empire Lath & Plaster, 135 P.3d 797, 803 (Mont. 2006) (citing Estate of
Spicher v. Miller, 861 P.2d 183, 185 (Mont. 1993)) (“[I]f after being discharged and mingling with
the public, jurors are permitted to impeach verdicts which they have rendered, it would open the door
for tampering with jurors and would place it in the power of a dissatisfied or corrupt juror to destroy
a verdict to which he had deliberately given his assent under sanction of an oath. . . .”).
24. Id. at 803.
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 51.
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 51(b)(3) (emphasis added).
27. Id.
28. The circuit courts were split in this way on the issue: the Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuits all agree with a totality of the circumstances approach. On the contrary, the Eighth
Circuit held that a bright-line rule is necessary. See infra notes 31-50 and accompanying text.
29. Dietz v. Bouldin, 794 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1885 (2016).
30. Summers v. United States, 11 F.2d 583, 586 (4th Cir. 1926). This decision established an
exception to the general rule that discharged juries cannot be recalled. The exception allows for a
recall when the discharged jury still had remained an undispersed unit under the control of the court.
Id.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss3/11

6

Ciccolini: When to Recall Discharged Juries

2017]

WHEN TO RECALL DISCHARGED JURIES

925

In this 1926 case, the judge had said, “[y]ou are discharged” to the jury;
however, the court held that just speaking those words was not enough to
prohibit recalling the jury because the jury was still an “undispersed unit,
within the control of the court, with no opportunity to mingle with or
discuss the case with others.” 31 Thus, this court gave more meaning to the
jury’s actual conduct than to the judge’s spoken words ordering
discharge. 32 Similarly, in 1994, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that a jury was still able to be recalled and polled despite being
technically discharged. 33 The court’s reasoning was that the jury had not
yet left the courthouse; therefore it could still be controlled by the court. 34
In fact, the jurors were sitting in the jury room alone and untainted by any
outside sources, waiting to be escorted to the parking lot. 35
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision of the Dietz case was
decided in conjunction with these preceding opinions. 36 It agreed with the
reasoning in the Third Circuit that a momentary release of the jury “did
not subject them to outside influence.” 37 Though the jurors may be
subjected to outside influences once dismissed, the court reasoned that
such influence is not guaranteed to occur. 38 It added a new layer that the
other circuit courts before it failed to do—require that the court and
counsel (if permitted by the court) consider the jury’s actions from the
time they were dismissed to the time they were recalled.39 The court
emphasized that this power to recall should be the exception and not the
rule, “lest the sanctity of untainted jury deliberations be compromised.” 40

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. United States v. Marinari, 32 F.3d 1209, 1209-15 (7th Cir. 1994). Another issue in this
case was whether or not the case had been made “final.” The court stated there must be a “terminating
event” that brings to life the judge’s order that the jury is dismissed. The court, echoing similar
thoughts from the Summers court, see supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text, determined that the
jury is discharged when they actually separate or disperse, i.e., are no longer a controlled unit. Id. at
1213-14.
34. Id. at 1214.
35. Id. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 2010 came to a similar conclusion that juries
that had been discharged but that had not yet dispersed could be recalled in order to re-read the verdict
form which was inconsistently read the first time. United States v. Rojas, 617 F.3d 669, 669-79 (2d
Cir. 2010). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals also decided that a jury that was dismissed and had
exited the courtroom but that was immediately brought back was an appropriate action of the judge
because the members did not “interact with any outside individuals, ideas, or coverages of the
proceedings.” United States v. Figueroa, 683 F.3d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 2012).
36. Dietz v. Bouldin, 794 F.3d 1093, 1093-1102 (9th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1885 (2016).
37. Figueroa, 683 F.3d at 73.
38. Dietz, 794 F.3d at 1099.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1100.
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The Eighth Circuit is the lone circuit court to hold that there must be
a bright-line rule determining whether or not judges can recall dismissed
juries. 41 In Wagner v. Jones, the court found that the district judge erred
in recalling a jury that was discharged after the court declared the case a
mistrial. 42 The court was unaware that the jury had reached a verdict on
Count I of the claim, and wrongly thought that both Count I and Count II
were undecided. 43 The bright-line rule of this court is that once a jury has
been dismissed, it “can no longer render, reconsider, amend, or clarify a
verdict.” 44 Not only did the court find that this bright-line rule was more
aligned with precedent, but the court also found that it actually ensures
that the verdict is not tainted by outside prejudice. 45 Furthermore, the
court determined that the amorphous rules, such as the rule later
determined in Dietz, “leaves much to chance.” 46 The bright-line rule
anticipates that jurors are more or less likely to be prejudiced by outside
influences if the design of the courthouse is structured a certain way and
if there are many people mingling outside the courtroom. 47 The Eighth
Circuit also noted that the district judge who recalled the jury had not
made it clear to the jurors why they were being recalled—to rescind the
mistrial. 48 Most importantly, because the jury was discharged, there were
no instructions given to the jurors that they could not speak to one another
or to any other people about the case. 49
Despite the fact that the Ninth Circuit took the same position that the
majority of the circuit courts had, the ruling of the Eighth Circuit and other
cases like Wagner (that reject the exception in Summers) shed light on the
concerns that have now become more serious with the Supreme Court’s
resolution of the circuit split. 50
41. Wagner v. Jones, 758 F.3d 1030, 1030-37 (8th Cir. 2014).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1033.
44. Id. at 1035.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1035-36.
48. Id. at 1036.
49. Id. The court notes that there is a “marked difference between an admonished jury” that
leaves the courthouse supervision knowing it still has to come back and decide a verdict, and one that
leaves the courthouse supervision “under the impression that the case is over and their duties
complete.” Id. at 1035 n.9.
50. See Mohan v. Exxon Corp., 704 A.2d 1348, 1352 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (“Once
the jury is beyond the control of the court and relieved from the adherence to and strictures of court
instruction (in this case for four days), the jury is no longer a functioning entity capable of resurrection
at the call of a judicial officer.”); see also Pumphrey v. Empire Lath & Plaster, 135 P.3d 797, 804
(Mont. 2006) (“We adopt the rule that a jury lacks any authority to revisit, alter or amend its verdict—
including via juror polling—after the trial court has discharged the jurors and any of them have left
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III. DIETZ V. BOULDIN AND THE PREJUDICE TEST FOR DECIDING TO
RECALL A DISCHARGED JURY
A.

The Facts of the Case

The state court case that made its way to the highest court in the
country involves a typical driving accident. 51 Rocky Dietz brought this
case against Hillary Bouldin to recover for injuries sustained in a car
collision. 52 The district court stipulated to damages of $10,136 for Dietz’s
medical expenses. 53 The only issue for the jury was deciding if Dietz
should recover more than the stipulated amount of $10,136. 54 While the
jury was deliberating, the jury asked the judge about Dietz’s medical bills
via a note. 55 The jurors wanted to know if the bills had been paid and, if
so, who had paid them. 56 Because of the previous stipulation, the judge
responded that the jury question was irrelevant, misleading the jury to
award $0 in damages. 57 Before the judge could realize the legally incorrect
verdict, the jury was dismissed and all of the members had left the
courtroom. 58
All of the jurors had remained in the building lingering in the
hallways, with the exception of one who had left the building but had not
gone too far. 59 Once the clerk had gathered all of the jurors and the
petitioner had objected, the judge recalled the jury and brought them back
into the courtroom. The judge questioned the jurors as a group, asking
them collectively whether or not they had spoken to anyone in the
interim. 60 The judge was certain after the questioning that there was no
prejudice because the jurors unanimously stated they had not spoken to
anyone about the case. 61 The jury was instructed to come back the next
day, where it awarded Dietz $15,000 in damages, amending the previous
the presence, control and supervision of the court.”); Melton v. Commonwealth, 111 S.E. 291, 294
(Va. 1922) (“When the court announces [jurors] discharge, and they leave the presence of the court,
their functions as jurors have ended, and neither with nor without the consent of the court can they
amend or alter their verdict. The sanctity of jury trials cannot be thus subjected to the hazard of
suspicion.”).
51. Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885 (2016).
52. Id. at 1888.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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final verdict of $0. 62 After the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court
decision, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the case and applied
standards of inherent authority bestowed to judges. 63 The Court reviewed
the requirements of inherent authority and affirmed that recalling a
dismissed jury was part of federal judges’ authority; it held that the lower
court had not abused its discretion. 64 First, the Court found that recalling
a dismissed jury to correct an error in the verdict is a reasonable response
to a problem. 65 Secondly, the Court determined that there was not any
other rule or statute preventing the court from creating this new power.66
Lastly, the Court noted that the inherent power must be “carefully
circumscribed” so that a jury is not wrongfully prejudiced. 67
B.

The New Precedent Set by Dietz v. Bouldin

The Court expressed four factors that district court judges need to
use to determine whether or not a dismissed jury can be fairly recalled to
change the verdict. 68 The first factor the Court created as part of its
prejudice test is the length of delay between the discharge and the recall. 69
According to the Court, the jury is more likely to be prejudiced the longer
they have been away from the court’s instruction.70 The Court, however,
leaves the federal court judges with the decision of deciding exactly how
long is too long. 71 The second factor the Court discussed was whether or
not the jurors had talked to anyone about the case since being away from
the court and from their juror duties. 72 The Court suggests that even
seemingly insignificant comments from people who watched the trial
could be enough to prejudice a juror. 73 The third factor the Court analyzed

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1889.
65. Id. at 1888. The Court uses standards from two of its prior decisions, noting that district
courts have the power to “manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious
disposition of cases.” Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962). It also applied the standard
from Degen v. United States that an inherent power must be “a reasonable response to the problems
and needs” of the court’s requirement to uphold justice and that it cannot contradict an express
limitation required by statute. 517 U.S. 820, 823-25 (1996).
66. Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1889. The Court did not find a limitation in FED. R. CIV. P. 51(b)(3) or
in any other rules regarding post-verdict remedies. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1894-95.
69. Id. at 1894.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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was whether or not the jury was exposed to any reactions upon rendering
the verdict, either while they were still in the courtroom or while they
were walking throughout the courthouse. 74 Lastly, the Court requires that
federal judges ask the jurors about their smartphone or Internet access
after dismissal. 75 The Court realizes, though without giving it enough
weight, that people check their phones quite often and that prejudice can
come quickly if jurors accessed their phones at all post-discharge. 76 Upon
applying all of these factors, the Court upheld the Ninth Circuit’s and the
district court’s decision to recall the jury in this case because it was not
wrongly influenced and could still fairly serve its duty. 77
C.

The Petitioner’s Arguments

The petitioner’s argument is strict—recalling is prohibited. The two
broad arguments supporting this stance are as follows: (1) a federal court
lacks the inherent authority to recall discharged jurors; and (2) a brightline rule against recalling discharged jurors appropriately addresses issues
of fairness and finality. 78
1. Lack of Authority Argument
The petitioner argued that there are no rules in civil procedure
regarding such inherent authority and that there is a fundamental principle
that jurors go back to their normal daily lives once discharged. The most
applicable rule, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51(b)(3), states that a jury
can be instructed by the court before it is discharged. 79 Of note, there is
not an option for a district court to reopen a case to change the verdict
after the jury is discharged. 80
Furthermore, once jurors are discharged, they “return to being an
ordinary citizen,” and the court is powerless to give more instruction to
them. 81 While serving as jurors, they lose some of their individual
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1895.
76. Id. (“Prejudice can come through a whisper or a byte.”).
77. Id. at 1897 (“Federal district courts have a limited inherent power to . . . recall a jury in a
civil case. District courts should exercise this power cautiously and courts of appeals should review
its invocation carefully.”).
78. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at *7-21.
79. Id. at *10-12.
80. Id. at *16. This is similar to FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b) as well as FED. R. CRIM. P. 33, which
both do not explicitly allow a dismissed jury to be recalled by a district court. Id. It is also similar to
FED. R. CIV. P. 48(c) and FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(d) which state that counsel’s request to poll the jury
terminates once the jury is discharged. Id.
81. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at *18.
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freedoms and are asked to follow specific instructions, such as to not
access press coverage and to avoid discussions with people about the
case. 82 However, as soon as the jury is discharged by the court, the
“protective shield” is removed and the jurors are free to use their
smartphones, hold conversations, watch the news, and reconsider their
decisions made in the deliberating room. 83
The petitioner also argues that none of the three steps that decide if
a district court has this inherent authority have been met in this case. 84 The
first step questions whether a relevant statute or rule overrides judges’
alleged inherent power, 85 and as previously stated, Civil Rule 51 (b)(3)
directly conflicts with judges’ power to recall juries post-discharge. 86 The
court then must consider whether there is any evidence of a special history
of recalling discharged jurors. 87 I discussed earlier in this Article that there
is a history of judges not reconvening a discharged jury, per the brightline rule. 88 Lastly, the court must determine that if there is a history of this
alleged power to recall, by assessing whether it is “necessary to the
exercise” of the federal court’s powers and whether it is sufficiently
“limited by the necessity giving rise to its exercise.” 89 Without this ability
to recall, however, judges can still exercise all of their powers, such as
managing their own dockets and ordering new trials. 90
2. Bright-Line Rule Argument
The petitioner argued that a bright-line rule prohibiting the recall of
discharged jurors promotes better assurance of fairness and protects the
“sanctity of jury verdicts.” 91 Not only may jurors be prejudiced by others

82. Id. at *19.
83. Id. at *8. See also Capital Cities Media, Inc v. Toole, 463 U.S. 1303, 1306 (1983) (“Any
interest in shielding jurors from pressure [that occurs] during the course of the trial becomes
attenuated after the jury brings in its verdict and is discharged.”).
84. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at *13.
85. Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996) (“In many instances the inherent powers
of the courts may be controlled or overridden by statute or rule.”).
86. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at *23 (“Recalling discharged jurors for further service
in a case would ‘circumvent or conflict with’ a variety of civil and criminal rules constricting a federal
court’s authority upon discharge.”).
87. Id. (“There is no ‘long unquestioned’ history of courts recalling discharged jurors for
further service in a case.”).
88. See supra notes 5-27 and accompanying text.
89. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at *23.
90. Id. at *31-32. (“Even absent the power to recall discharged jurors, existing rules already
provide ample procedures for remedying an invalid or ambiguous verdict after the jury has been
discharged: most notably, a new trial.”).
91. Id. at *36.
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while discharged, but jurors may change their minds once outside of the
deliberation room and after the verdict is rendered. 92 Jurors may re-think
their decisions by “merely having additional time to reflect.” 93 Finality is
also promoted by a bright-line rule prohibiting this authority for federal
judges because there will be less re-opening of cases. 94 The justification
for allowing the recall of discharged jurors—that it is more cost-effective
than starting a new trial—is not enough to outweigh the more important
issues. Both issues of fairness and finality are essential to keeping a jury
trial a sacrosanct right.
IV. REPLACING THE TEST FROM DIETZ
A.

Dietz’s Prejudice Test Allows Too Much Judicial Discretion

The Supreme Court’s new prejudice test does not afford enough
protection to ensure that dismissed juries are not changing verdicts in
unfair ways post-recall. The judges have far too much lee-way in deciding
whether or not a case should be given a new trial or whether or not the
jury should be recalled to correct the error in the verdict. Imagine if the
hypothetical facts below had occurred in the Walter Smith case discussed
at the beginning of this Article where the jury’s verdict was legally
inconsistent. Using this new Supreme Court test, how would a judge
decide what to do?
Upon the jury’s dismissal, the jurors had all left the courtroom. While
juror number one was mingling in the hallway just outside the courtroom,
she noticed a spectator who had sat through the entire trial walk out of the
courtroom with tears streaming down her face. Juror number two had
coincidentally made eye contact with Mrs. Smith, Walter’s mother, as she
walked by her at the conclusion of the trial. Mrs. Smith mouthed the words
“shame on you” to the juror. After leaving the courthouse, before driving
home, juror number three texted his wife and said “heading home, we
awarded him the right amount of money.” As the juror was driving his
wife responds, “I’m sure you did the right thing.” Juror number four went
straight home after the trial and searched the Internet for the victim’s
obituary, which he found. Juror number five was on the sidewalk near the
courthouse waiting for the bus when he did a search on his phone for the
92. Id. at *34.
93. Id. at *35. See Wagner v. Jones, 758 F.3d 1030, 1036 (8th Cir. 2014) (“We hesitate to give
a vacillating juror an opportunity to reconsider, after he or she has already been polled and discharged,
especially where there is the possibility that the jury, or some of its members, may have been confused
in the understanding of the instructions.”).
94. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at *38.
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defendant Greenwich’s website. Jurors numbers six and seven had a brief
discussion about the case and made comments that they were both glad it
was over. Juror number eight took to Facebook upon arriving home and
posted that she was done with her civic duty and felt good about the jury’s
decision. 95 In only an hour’s time, she had several comments left on her
post from her friends. Because of a busy docket, the judge could not recall
this exact jury until three days later where the jurors were back to amend
the flawed verdict. Assume no other conversations, Internet searches, or
social media posts occurred by these or any other jurors.
1. First Factor—Length of Delay Between Discharge and Recall
The Supreme Court noted that the longer the jury has been dismissed,
the more likely there will be prejudice because jurors will likely forget
key facts from the case and may overlook the importance of the jury’s
role. 96 The only specific reference to the length of delay that the Court
mentions is stating that the dismissal could possibly last just a few
minutes, as it did in that case.97 In the hypothetical scenario presented
above, the dismissed jury went about their lives for three whole days
before they were asked to report back to the courthouse to decide issues
on the same case. In that amount of time, the jurors could be exposed to
varying amounts of prejudice, from a comment made by a friend to an
article on the Internet reporting about how the case turned out. In the
Court’s test, the other factors may give reasons for a new trial if such
exposure occurred. Yet, this time factor alone would not be reason enough
to say that the jury should not be recalled.
If in Walter Smith’s case the jurors came back after three days and
all stated that they did not talk to anyone about the case, did not search the
Internet, and did not witness any emotional outcries in the courtroom, then
they would be able to sit back in the juror box and change the verdict.
Even without experiencing any outside influences, the jurors could still
simply change their minds within those three days. 98 During that time
away from the case and away from the instruction of the court, the jurors’

95. See United States v. Liu, 69 F. Supp. 3d 374, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (denying a new trial,
although a juror had posted general comments on Twitter about the case but had not included anything
regarding the substance of the case).
96. Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1894 (2016) (“In taking off their juror ‘hats’ and
returning to their lives, they may lose sight of the vital collective role they played in the impartial
administration of justice.”).
97. Id.; see also People v. Grider, 246 Cal. App. 2d 149, 149 (1966) (deciding that nine minutes
was too long for the jury to have been dismissed and then recalled).
98. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at *34.
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own reflections can affect them; they could very likely ruminate about
their decision in the case and suddenly change their mind or rethink why
they casted their vote the way they had. 99 Therefore, the Supreme Court
should have given a specific time frame for how long would be too long
for a jury to be discharged and still come back to amend a verdict. Not
knowing where the line will be crossed affords judges too much discretion
in assuming prejudice has not occurred while the jury has been discharged
for any amount of time.
2. Second Factor—Conversing About the Case
The Supreme Court gave more yet still inadequate guidance in
stating its second factor of the prejudice test, which asks whether the
jurors had spoken to anyone about the case post-discharge. 100 The Court
lists a number of people whom could potentially speak to the jury and taint
them, including press, spouses, and witnesses. 101 This list, however, is not
exhaustive, leaving the possibilities seemingly endless for what kind of
person and in what context someone could have an effect on a discharged
juror. 102 The Court further provides that even “innocuous comments”
about the case, such as saying “job well done,” could constitute prejudice
in this scenario. 103
The Court does not make it explicitly clear, however, how the federal
court judge making this decision should characterize the question when
asking the jury. It is extremely easy to see how a judge deciding whether
to utilize this power to recall a jury could ask this question to the jury
hastily and without much description. For example, the transcription
could look something like this:
Judge: Now, in this time that you’ve been let go from your duties as a
juror, did you speak to anyone about the case?
Foreperson: No, your Honor. No one in the jury spoke to anyone after
discharge.

99. Id. at *23; see Gugliotta v. Morano, 829 N.E.2d 757, 764 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (deciding
whether or not to recall a dismissed jury, the judge polled each juror asking if there was a potential
for prejudice, and one juror stated that her “emotional state had changed when the judge told the jury
it was dismissed”).
100. Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1894.
101. Id. Other people the Court mentions are court staff, attorneys, litigants, sketch artists, and
friends.
102. Id. The Court lists people who could prejudice the jury and then says “and so on,”
indicating that it foresees the impossibility of limiting the type of prejudice that could occur. Id.
103. Id.
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Through this quick dialogue, it would be easy for a juror to not realize that
a comment such as in the example above, “job well done,” is considered
a prejudicial conversation, according to the rule set out by the Supreme
Court. Only a very astute juror would, before answering, ask the very
necessary question: “What type of comments or conversation constitutes
having spoken to someone about the case?” In most cases, if the judge
does not make it clear that even brief comments in passing could have
prejudicial effects, the jury itself will not presume that they do.
Outside conversation also means that prior to the case ending the
jurors are not to discuss the case amongst themselves. 104 Typical jury
instructions include a segment on how the jurors may not talk to each other
about the case until the end and unless every juror is present and no one
else is. 105 In this new scenario of recalling a discharged jury, clearly the
jurors have already spoken to each other about the case because the verdict
was rendered. However, post-discharge, the jurors are free to speak to
each other outside of the entire jury’s presence, so the Supreme Court’s
factor asking whether jurors had spoken to anyone should also include the
other juror members themselves. Upon being dismissed and away from
the court’s instruction, jurors will likely talk amongst themselves about
the case. Yet again, assuming that the judge will ask this specific question
is assuming too much. At the time of polling, the judge may simply forget
to ask if they spoke to each other or could refuse to ask this question
specifically to keep the trial moving. 106
In the hypothetical case of Walter Smith, there are four jurors who
had technically spoken to another individual about the case. The Supreme
Court’s factor test, however, will not expose all of these conversations so
104. HANDBOOK FOR TRIAL JURORS SERVING IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, supra
note 18 (“Jurors should not discuss the case even among themselves until it is concluded.”).
105. See MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT, MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
courts.mi.gov/Courts/MichiganSupremeCourt/mcji/Documents/Model%20Civil%20Jury%20Instruc
tions.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7KJ-J3XL] (last visited Jan. 18, 2017). The court has the choice to read
Alternative A, which allows the jurors to speak to each other during the trial’s recess so long as they
follow the rest of the rules, or Alternative B, which states:
Before you are sent to the jury room to decide the case, you are not to discuss the case
even with the other members of the jury. This is to ensure that all of you are able to participate in all of the discussions about the case, and so that you do not begin to express
opinions about the case until it has been submitted to you for deliberation.
Id. at 2-11; see also ILLINOIS COURTS, GENERAL CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTIONS 2,
http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/Circuitcourt/civilJuryInstructions/IL_IPI_Civil.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8G4R-LTXZ] (last visited Jan. 18, 2017); see also NEW JERSEY COURTS, NEW
JERSEY MODEL CIVIL JURY CHARGES, https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/civil/civindx.html
[https://perma.cc/5CGK-NERZ] (last visited Jan. 18, 2017).
106. See infra notes 159-161 and accompanying text regarding judges feeling pressured to clear
their dockets.
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that they are addressed and contemplated as part of the judge’s decision
to recall. Juror number two may not be thinking that a conversation took
place when Mrs. Smith looked at her and mouthed “shame on you.” For
the juror to mention this, the judge would likely need to clarify that even
such innocuous comments are considered conversation. Juror number
three who texted his wife about the outcome may not have thought of that
as a conversation since he was simply telling his wife what happened but
did not discuss the details of the case. Lastly, jurors number six and seven
may not tell the judge about their conversation because, without the judge
specifically asking, they may assume that conversations amongst jurors
did not amount to prejudice and were acceptable, especially considering
they have already all deliberated together. These problematic issues would
be avoided if the Supreme Court had required judges to be very specific
when asking questions about conversations jurors had during the time they
were discharged. The importance of this question must not be lost on the
jurors; thus, it must not be lost on the judges, either.
3. Third Factor—Exposure to Emotional Reactions
The third factor that federal judges must consider in their decisions
to recall a discharged jury is whether or not the jury was exposed to any
reactions post-verdict in the courtroom or corridors of the courthouse.107
This rule recognizes that if jurors witness emotional outcries, cheers,
gasps, or the like, they can begin to reconsider their decisions. 108 This type
of individual, discrete reconsideration is exactly what the Court is trying
to avoid through the new prejudice test. This particular factor is extremely
relevant, for “[a]ny judge who has sat with juries knows that in spite of
forms [juries] are extremely likely to be impregnated by the environing
atmosphere.” 109 This particular factor is extremely important because of
the fact that spectators can easily affect juries, whether it is unintentional
or intentional. 110
107. Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1894.
108. Id.
109. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 349 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the
holding that the rejection of the application for a writ of habeas corpus be affirmed because the jury’s
decision was affected by the spectators packing the court, by a mob surrounding the court outside,
and by the judge conferring with the police chief in the presence of the jury, amongst other issues of
prejudice to the jury).
110. See id.
When we find the judgment of the expert on the spot, of the judge whose business it was
to preserve not only form, but substance to have been that if one juryman yielded to the
reasonable doubt that he himself later expressed in court as the result of most anxious
deliberation, neither prisoner nor counsel would be safe from the rage of the crowd, we
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This factor issued by the Supreme Court does not address exactly
how the judge asks the jury if it has witnessed any emotional reactions.
This creates a double-edge sword: If the judge asks a blanket question
whether the jurors have witnessed such emotional responses, they may not
know what that entails and thus not disclose everything necessary. Yet, if
the judge happened to witness a response of some kind and asks the jury
about that specific reaction, then the jurors may all become prejudiced
even without witnessing the scene or hearing the emotional response
because the judge informed them of it. For example, a judge in Georgia
may have accidentally prejudiced the jury by asking if while deliberating
any of them witnessed a gathering outside the window in the jury’s
sight. 111 A man had tied a noose in a rope and waved it in the jury’s
view. 112 The majority of the jurors responded that they had not witnessed
it, but now it creates a dilemma since they are aware that such conduct
occurred. 113
Such emotional reactions are more likely to occur in criminal cases
where defendants are facing prison sentences and more severe charges. 114
In cases where spectators’ “demonstrations” made during the trial have
led the court to decide whether a new trial, mistrial, or reversal of a
criminal conviction should be granted, courts have looked at several
factors including the length and nature of demonstrations, as well as the
number of demonstrators. 115 For example, a Louisiana court granted a new
trial when, during the defense attorney’s closing argument for a murder
trial, a woman ran her finger under her throat. 116 Four of the jurors had
witnessed the gesture and told the court that they were not affected by it,
but the court reasoned that a juror is not competent to show “how that

think the presumption overwhelming that the jury responded to the passions of the mob.
Id.
111. Douglass v. State, 110 S.E. 168, 172-73 (Ga. 1921).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 173. (“The slightest demonstration within the view and comprehension of the jury
may have been sufficient to turn the delicate scale of justice, so evenly balanced as it seems to have
been during the deliberations of the jury.”).
114. Disruptive Conduct of Spectators in Presence of Jury During Criminal Trial as Basis for
Reversal, New Trial, or Mistrial—Gestures, Passive Demonstrations, and the Like, 3 A.L.R.7th Art.
3 (2015). Trial spectators’ conduct affects jurors in criminal cases because “the defendant may feel
that the jury has been unfairly influenced when attendees shake fists or glare at him or her or at
witnesses, hug or otherwise comfort the victim, or wear clothing or emblems or hold up signs
memorializing the victim.” Id.
115. Id. Other factors include: “whether the defendant was acquitted of more serious charges,
the strength of the evidence of guilt, whether counsel objected to, or the trial court noted, the first
instance of misconduct, the identity of the demonstrating spectator. . . .” Id.
116. State v. Henry, 198 So. 910, 921 (La. 1940).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss3/11

18

Ciccolini: When to Recall Discharged Juries

2017]

WHEN TO RECALL DISCHARGED JURIES

937

influence operated on his mind.” 117 Another court offered cautionary
instruction to a jury that similarly witnessed spectators’ facial expressions
and gestures indicating disapproval of the defense counsel’s closing
argument. 118 That jury also witnessed the victim’s mother stand, put her
hands over her head, and direct applause toward defense counsel. 119 These
examples are clear instances where the jury was prejudiced during a
criminal trial.
However, similar reactions could likely occur in a civil case, such as
in the hypothetical case of Walter Smith. Juror number one was exposed
to an emotional reaction while he was standing in the corridor of the
courthouse and witnessed a spectator leave the courtroom crying. The
judge should be “reluctant” 120 to bring back a discharged jury if it has
witnessed reactions to the verdict, but a particular judge may not find a
few tears to be considered prejudicial emotion at the cost of ordering a
whole new trial. Again, there is too much discretion given to judges
regarding this factor. Perhaps this judge has witnessed much more
prejudicial types of reactions in the pastsuch as a spectator coming at
the defendant with a chair in the courtroomso that discrete crying
witnessed by only one juror seems insubstantial in comparison. 121 Such
comparison should not be a factor in this judge’s analysis of whether
jurors were affected by spectators’ emotions, but the Dietz test affords
federal judges so much latitude that it is possible.
Furthermore, juror number one in Walter’s case may declare to the
judge that her decision will not be affected by witnessing the woman
crying, but that raises the question of whether anyone can really know
how observing such emotions will weigh on one’s ability to make
decisions based on the law. 122 If judges rely on the Dietz test, they could
possibly taint the jurors accidentally, or they could wrongly ensure that
jurors have not witnessed any emotional reactions, despite that every
117. Id. at 922.
118. State v. Weinberg, 575 A.2d 1003 (Conn. 1990).
119. Id.; see also State v. Stewart, 295 S.E.2d 627, 630 (S.C. 1982) (reversing a judgment for
conviction of murder because there were several fits of laughter from spectators and because one juror
reported that a spectator had been glaring at her with “obvious disgust” and had made opinionated
remarks overheard by other jury members); Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1990) (reversing
the denial of habeas corpus relief when the court noticed spectators with buttons that read “Women
Against Rape” inside the courtroom for a trial on kidnapping and sexual intercourse without consent).
120. Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1894-95 (2016) (explaining that witnessing emotional
reactions can cause jurors to ask themselves “‘Did I make the right call?’”).
121. Collier v. State, 42 S.E. 226 (Ga. 1902) (explaining that the husband of a prosecuting
witness in a rape case went after the defendant with a chair and approximately 200 people got up on
seats to view the defendant).
122. See supra notes 116 and 117 and accompanying text.
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claimant’s basic rights afford him a fair day in court. The Dietz test does
not ensure that jurors will understand if they have witnessed a prejudicial
reaction, nor does it ensure that they will come forward with the
information as they should.
4. Fourth Factor—Access to Smartphones and Internet
Last in the Court’s four-factor prejudice test is the factor regarding
jurors’ use of their smartphones and the Internet. 123 Texting one’s spouse
about the case and using Google to research about the evidence in the case
are examples of how a juror could be prejudiced in this way. 124 The key
to this factor seems to be relevance. If jurors texted something to their
spouses or used the Internet to search something that had nothing to do
with the case, then such use is likely acceptable. The problem arises when
a juror uses a phone or the Internet to interact with others, post on social
media, or research something relevant to the case. Like all parts of the
Dietz test, the question is how much prejudice is too much prejudice.
Researching aspects of the case and posting on social media are
grounds for jury misconduct, and courts have remedied such cases of
misconduct by granting new trials. For example, new trials were granted
because of the following juror misconduct: posting on Facebook during
the trial and deliberations about having to look at horrible photos; 125
becoming friends with the victim’s mother on Facebook and writing her
comments about what she wished would have happened with the
verdict; 126 and researching deferred compensation rules which were
material to ten separate counts the defendant was facing. 127 A conviction
was reversed in another case where a juror expressed on Twitter the
difficulty in making decisions. 128 These types of juror misconduct easily
cause problems with the present issue. If a judge is to recall a discharged
jury, the judge should verify that while discharged no jurors posted
content regarding the case, researched information related to the case, or
texted/talked about the case. However, the precedent now set in Dietz does

123. Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1895 (“It is a now-ingrained instinct to check our phones whenever
possible.”).
124. Id. (“Immediately after discharge, a juror could text something about the case to a spouse,
research an aspect of the evidence on Google, or read reactions to a verdict on Twitter.”).
125. United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2014).
126. State v. Webster, No. 131095, 2014 WL 5861967, at *9 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014).
127. United States v. LaRoque, No. 4:12CR881H, 2014 WL 683729, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 20,
2014).
128. Dimas-Martinez v. State, 385 S.W. 3d 238, 246-48 (Ark. 2011). The juror had tweeted on
Twitter: “Choices to be made. Hearts to be broken. We each define the great line.” Id.
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not require that jurors be individually polled. 129 The Dietz test also does
not include references to other types of research conducted without using
the Internet, such as research from a dictionary or a library reference book.
In the hypothetical case of Walter Smith, three jurors’ Internet and
social media uses under the Dietz test would likely bring about
inconsistent analyses of prejudice. Both jurors four and five used the
Internet for related material: the victim’s obituary and the defendant
company’s website. Under the Dietz test, two judges may look at those
facts and come to differing opinions because there is no barometer for
what the Court was attempting to make precedent. Is an obituary
prejudicial? Does researching the company website matter if what the
juror found had already been discussed at trial? Additionally, juror
number eight’s comment on Facebook may be deemed prejudicial to some
judges, while others may view it as simply a general comment not
amounting to any level of prejudice. 130 Judges making this decision would
be left to use their own personal opinions about what constitutes a
comment or research that is related to the case. The inconsistencies would
be great. Without an individual jury poll, judges would never obtain the
information necessary to make an accurate decision about whether the
social media or outside resources jurors used was so influential as to
amount to prejudice.
B.

Solution—Implement A Balancing Test

Dietz is a step in the right direction because this power afforded to
judges prevents cases from being retried for mistakes that could be easily
fixed with the same jury. It is no secret that not having a new trial saves
both parties time, money, and the distress of not gaining closure sooner,
not to mention that is prevents court congestion. In fact, the situation in
Dietz is in many ways the perfect scenario for when judges should recall
a discharged jury. 131 However, the guidelines now left to federal judges
from this case are hardly guidelines at all; it is difficult for judges to know
exactly when to recall juries and when to grant new trials. The Court
should instead adopt a more streamlined test that asks judges to consider
the risk of prejudice against the burden of a new trial. To enhance fairness
to each claimant, if there is a clear mistake with the verdict, the
129. Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1896-97 (“While individual questioning could be the better practice in
many circumstances, Dietz’s attorney raised no objection to this part of the court’s process. We
decline to review this forfeited objection.”). Individual questioning is suggested but not required.
130. See United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 298 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that a juror’s
Facebook post commenting about the case was harmless and did not rise to the level of prejudice).
131. See supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text regarding the facts of Dietz.
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presumption should be that a new trial will be granted unless the risk of
prejudice is less than the burden of starting a new trial with an entirely
new jury. As opposed to the large discrepancies that could happen using
the Supreme Court’s test, this test will still enable judges to use their own
discretion, but it tightens the amount of latitude and allows for more
consistency.
The Federal Rules of Evidence has a similar balancing test for
deciding whether or not to exclude relevant evidence.132 Rule 403
balances the evidence’s probative value with the possible dangers of
bringing in the evidence, such as unfair prejudice, jury confusion, and
wasting time. 133 If one of the dangers substantially outweighs the
probative value, the court may exclude the evidence that is otherwise
relevant. This kind of balancing act is exactly what is needed for the
present issue because it still allows for judicial discretion, but it offers an
actual test to consult, not just mere guidelines.
1. Proposed Test—A Deeper Look at the Risk of Prejudice
a. Jury Questionnaire
Practically speaking, a federal judge looking to recall a jury postverdict should ask about instances of prejudice to each juror before
allowing the same jury to sit again on the case.134 Rather than asking these
questions to the jury collectively, the judge should issue a type of written
jury questionnaire to each juror to complete individually without
discussion with other jurors. The questionnaire can therefore ask more
specific questions and give examples of the kind of prejudice that may
have occurred while they were discharged. This way, judges will not have
to make examples on the spot of how prejudice can occur, and the form
can be consistently used by each judge in the jurisdiction. There will be
more consistency in these types of judicial decisions regarding recall, and
these forms will better document what informed the judge’s decision for
record-keeping purposes if the case is appealed.

132. FED. R. EVID. 403. “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”
Id.
133. Id.
134. See Dietz v Bouldin, 794 F.3d 1093-1102 (9th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1885 (2016)
(requiring that the court poll the jurors upon being recalled); see also supra notes 39-40 and
accompanying text.
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This questionnaire would work as a type of jury polling or inquiry so
that the judges receive the most accurate information from each individual
juror. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has a similar jury polling
that must take place upon a party’s request or which the court may issue
on its own. 135 In criminal cases, this polling takes place post-verdict but
prior to the discharge of the jury, and the purpose of it is to assure that the
jury made a unanimous decision without any coercion of jurors to agree
to the verdict. 136 Regarding the present issue, judges would issue this
individual polling via a standard written questionnaire so that jurors are
not influenced by other jurors’ verbal responses made to the judge. 137
b. Length of Delay—Must Recall within the Same Day of the
Verdict
As previously mentioned, juries have been viewed as a single unit
made up of individuals who only revert back to their individual mindsets,
so to speak, once they are dispersed back into society. 138 Upon dismissal,
jurors leave the environment where they rationalized their decision, and
they leave the people whom they deliberated with about the verdict. It is
not surprising that the Court fears the longer the jury has been dismissed,
the more likely it is susceptible to some kind of prejudice. 139 For these
reasons, federal judges should not be able to recall a jury that has been
discharged for over a day. Only if a mistake was found and the jury could
be recalled within the same day, noting the hours of the court, can the
same jury be asked to amend a verdict. If there is no possibility of bringing
in the same jury on the day that the mistake was made and the verdict read,
then the judge must automatically award a new trial.

135. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(d). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(d) advisory committee’s notes. There
is no actual language in the rule that requires polling be done individually, but the Committee
recommends it is. Id.
136. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(d) advisory committee’s notes.
137. See id. Collective polling of jurors does not save much time and is not adequate in
determining that a juror has not been coerced by others because there is no certainty that a juror who
was coerced would speak up as the dissenting voice.
138. See Porret v. City of New York, 169 N.E. 208, 208 (N.Y. 1929). Chief Judge Cardozo
stated that after discharge the jury “has ceased to be a jury, and, if its members happen to come
together again, they are there as individuals, and no longer as an organized group, an arm or agency
of the law.” Id.
139. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
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c. Conversation
A question that must be asked as part of the jury questionnaire, and
which is in line with the Dietz prejudice test, is whether or not the jury
members spoke to anyone about the case post-verdict. 140 It must be
specific and include examples such as spouses, bailiffs, friends, spectators
of the trial, and even other jurors if spoken to outside of the jury as a
whole. The question must also define “conversation” to mean simply any
communication whatsoever with another person about any aspect of the
case. The questionnaire would cover this inquiry best if it included the
Supreme Court’s description that even innocuous comments said to a juror
would count as prejudice. 141 The question should be broad enough to
include conversations made in person, via cell phone, or via social media.
The questionnaire should include a space for jurors to write exactly what
was discussed about the case, as well as whom the conversation was with.
Dietz does not allude to any real significance regarding who actually
speaks to the juror, just that conversation took place at all. However, it is
an important aspect when weighing the prejudicial factors against the
burden of a new trial. Certain comments may be more prejudicial to the
juror depending on who said it. If only one of the jurors had an
insignificant conversation with someone about the case, and no other
issues of prejudice were present at all, then a judge in applying this
proposed test may decide that the risk of prejudice is less than the burden
of having a new trial.
d. Emotional Reactions
The next question posed to each juror via this form should be whether
or not any juror witnessed emotional outcries or reactions during and after
the final verdict being read. The term emotional outcries or expressions
should be defined broadly on the form so that the jurors have a basis for
what they saw or heard that could have prejudiced them. An example of
the definition could be: “any reaction, response, or gesture, whether verbal
or non-verbal, that you witnessed that was in reaction, whether
simultaneously or not, to the outcome or the procedures of the trial.” The
question regarding emotional outcries should also be open-ended so that
jurors could write in any instances that they feel amounted to the court’s
definition and whether or not it would impact their ability to amend the
verdict. Though jurors may respond that they would not be affected by
140.
141.

See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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witnessing varying types of emotions, it should still be the judges’
ultimate decision. The judges, when viewing the questionnaires as a
whole, must decide whether or not the jurors’ witnessing of emotional
cries amounted to prejudice that would outweigh the burden of a new trial.
Jurors are not capable of making such decisions on their own as to whether
they have been prejudiced in this way. Judges should consider certain
emotional reactions, such as chairs being thrown or clapping and
hollering, to weigh heavily on the side of prejudice that is enough to
render a new trial.
e. Smartphone Access and Use of Extrinsic Evidence
The last component of the jury questionnaire should include
questions asking whether or not the jurors used their smartphone or
accessed any extrinsic evidence that is in any way connected to the trial.
This is an expansion of Dietz, which only references smartphone and
Internet use. A juror may come across a newspaper headline of the trial or
use an actual dictionary or other library sources to verify something postverdict. 142
The first question should ask whether jurors used their phone to call
or text, and if so, whether or not the case was discussed in any way. The
next question should ask whether or not the jurors used social media at
all, such as Facebook or Twitter, and if so, whether or not they posted any
information at all relating to the trial or to serving as a juror in the
particular case. The questionnaire should leave in space for the jurors to
transcribe verbatim the comments that they posted on social media, as
well as any follow-up comments that friends left, so that the judge may
know more quickly rather than having to investigate. If any juror responds
affirmatively to either of these questions and the information they spoke
of or posted related to the trial, then judges should be more likely to
indicate a high-risk of prejudice that is grounds for a new trial. 143 Posting
on social media is more severe because it involves access to more people
in a shorter amount of time, and the ways the juror could be prejudiced

142. See United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d 543 (11th Cir. 1994) (explaining that the court
granted a new trial where a juror used a dictionary to look up terminology while deliberating and had
also informed other jurors about a newspaper headline she had seen discussing the possible sentencing
the defendant could receive).
143. Similarly, in criminal cases, if a juror’s third-party communication is related to the case, it
is critical to determine if it is harmless prejudice or whether it is substantial. See Remmer v. United
States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954) (explaining that conversation is “presumptively prejudicial,” but the
government has a heavy burden to prove that the harm to the defendant was harmless).
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from it are seemingly endless. 144 Leaving comments about the trial on
social media “engenders responses that include extraneous information
about the case, or attempts to exercise persuasion and influence.”145 One
“like” on a juror’s post about the trial could be enough to prejudice that
juror because it approved that juror’s conduct or thought-process.
However, if the comments posted are “harmless ramblings” about
the case, then it may not rise to a level of prejudice that would warrant a
new trial when compared to the burdens of starting a new trial. 146 For
example, a juror posted on social media before the verdict was rendered,
“This is it . . . no looking back now!”; the post was considered
meaningless and not actual prejudice. 147 Because of this, it is critical that
judges take time to investigate what was exactly posted by jurors on social
media, as well as any responses posted by friends, to determine if the
prejudice is severe enough to tip the balancing scales towards ordering a
new trial.
The next question on the form should ask if the jurors post-discharge
used the Internet, whether on their smartphones or otherwise, or any other
outside documents or books to research information relating to the trial.
Researching information about the parties, elements of the case, and the
like should also be given the same bright-line standard, and there should
be an automatic new trial scheduled rather than letting the same jury
amend the verdict. 148 In these situations, jurors now have outside
information that could be used to sway their opinions once back inside the
deliberation room to amend the verdict. 149 Just as this is unacceptable
juror behavior and in violation of the jury instructions at any time during
a trial, it also should be deemed highly prejudicial if the jurors lawfully
144. See United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 305 (3d Cir. 2011) (“If anything, the risk of such
prejudicial communication may be greater when a juror comments on a blog or social media website
than when she has a discussion about the case in person, given that the universe of individuals who
are able to see and respond to a comment on Facebook or a blog is significantly larger.”).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 298.
147. Id. See also United States v. Villalobos, No. 14-40147, 2015 WL 544898, at *2 (5th Cir.
2015) (denying a new trial because the comments were vague and not prejudicial—the juror had
commented about wanting the trial to be over). Compare this to People v. Lozano, where a juror
posted specific details of the case, such as that the trial she was serving on was a child abuse case that
happened when the baby was four months old, and that everything weighed on the credibility of the
witnesses. No. D058370, 2011 WL 6217076 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2011). Still, the court in that case
did not order a new trial. Id.
148. See United States v. LaRoque, No. 4:12CR881H, 2014 WL 683729, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Feb.
20, 2014).
149. See id. (explaining that the judge had no idea which definition the juror used when making
his decision on the verdict—the one researched online or the definition and information provided
from the trial).
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behaved this way post-discharge, but were later recalled for the same
case. 150
2. Proposed Test—A Deeper Look at the Burden of a New Trial
a. Types of Burdens
If a judge finds any amount of potential prejudice to the jury, under
the proposed test the judge will weigh that potential for risk of prejudice
against the burdens of starting a new trial. The main burdens of starting a
new trial are, not surprisingly, additional costs to each party, having to
deal with congested courts, and the inevitable prolonged litigation.151
Parties want their cases to be over, but by starting a new trial, they have
to wait even longer for a resolution, which means waiting a long time to
receive the compensation they likely need immediately. 152 Not to mention
that if the party is a business, the business might be put on hold. 153 The
court also has to spend its own money in helping to manage the case,
deciding motions for the parties, and other ways in which it is involved in
the process of starting a new trial. 154 Other issues include the effect that
new trials have on the public’s distrust of and loss of confidence in the
judicial system. 155 The public starts to wonder if the courts operate as
equitable and timely as they should. 156 Furthermore, there is a real
possibility that in the time that the first case has ceased and the new trial

150. In criminal cases, there have been reversals and remandings due to jury misconduct for
using outside information. See Gibson v. Clanon, 633 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1035 (1981) (noting that jury members used a medical dictionary to determine aspects that were
material to the counts); see also United States v. Renteria, 625 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that
defendant alleged an entire tape recording was given to jury when only portions of the tape were
actually admitted); United States v. Vasquez, 597 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting that the court’s
official file containing inadmissible evidence had been left in the jury room).
151. See Michael Heise, Justice Delayed? An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition
Time, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813, 814 (2000). See generally George L. Priest, Private Litigation
and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U.L. REV. 527 (1989).
152. See Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, How Lawyers’ Institutions Prolong
Litigation, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 571, 573 (2013) (citing Nathalie Chappe, Demand for Civil Trials and
Court Congestion, 33 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 343, 344 (2012)) (“Delays in the resolution of legal disputes
create a wide variety of social costs: injured parties do not receive compensation when they most need
it, individuals are deterred from bringing cases, future offences are insufficiently deterred. . . .”).
153. See id.
154. Id. at 574.
155. Heise, supra note 151, at 814-15 (“Delays in the resolution of civil disputes erode public
confidence in the civil justice system, disappoint and frustrate those seeking compensation through
the legal system, and generate benefits for those with the financial ability to withstand delays or
otherwise benefit from them.”).
156. Id.
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begins, evidence has spoiled, witnesses’ memories have faded, and
witnesses or litigants have died. 157
According to an empirical study performed in 2000, the average civil
jury case tried in the United States took two and a half years to resolve
(30.2 months) from the time it was filed to the time the jury trial verdict
was announced. 158 A large factor contributing to this problem is the
backlog of cases that judges have on their dockets that have accumulated
over time. 159 Thus, in the present situation, federal judges must keep these
considerations in mind when faced with whether or not to order a new trial
because they are the ones in charge of their own dockets. The interplay
between this burden and the risk of prejudice is this: the concerns about
the burdens of starting a new trial will generally be the same in most
situations. However, the risk of prejudice is unique to each case and,
therefore, will need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
b. Judges’ Incentives as Case Managers
Because of all of these aforementioned burdens on the courts, it is
easy to see the incentive that judges have to use the same jury to amend
the verdict rather than opt for a new trial altogether. Judges are now acting
as case managers and have more power than ever to decide each piece of
the case and the scheduling and timing of it all. 160 With this fact that
judges have the power and the incentives to clear their dockets and keep
the cases moving, it makes it hard to believe that most judges pressed with
a decision to recall a discharged jury or start a new trial would consider
doing the latter. 161 Of course, if there is obvious prejudice that occurred
157. Id.
158. Id. at 833-36. In the sample conducted in Heise’s study, the most expeditious civil jury
trials were in Fairfax County, Virginia and took only 17.5 months to complete, while the longest trials
took over five years in Cook County, Illinois.
159. George L. Priest, Private Litigation and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U.L. Rev.
527, 527 (1989). Referencing the congestion problem articulated from a crucial study by using a
metaphor of a logjam from the lumber industry:
Cases flow into a court calendar in the way logs float into a lake. The determinants of the
size of the logjam at any point are the rate that logs flow into the lake, the rate that logs
flow out of the lake, and the number of logs stuck in the lake from earlier imbalances in
the flow.
Id.
160. Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J. 669,
669-74 (2010). Of note, empirical data shows that most attorneys have been satisfied with the case
management and believe it has benefitted their work. Id. at 687. However, judges involved in case
management have time taken away from their main job of trying cases. Id. at 694. Case management
is another “dangerous form of judicial activism.” Id. at 691-92.
161. See id. at 691-93. Judges who are effective case managers are involved in the Rule 16 stage
and are better able to tailor their cases in the beginning so that they are not overly expensive and
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to jurors once discharged, judges would likely face accusations of abuse
of discretion on appeal if they did not opt for a new trial. 162 But in those
cases that are close calls, it would be easy to see how a judge would want
to save a congested docket and simply bring back the discharged jury. For
these reasons, the proposed test balancing the two factors is much more
reliable than the Dietz test. The Supreme Court ignores the reality that
judges have their own hand and own concerns in cases, so a tightening of
this discretion is necessary.
C.

Application of the Proposed Balancing Test

If the proposed test was applied in the hypothetical Walter Smith
case, then it would automatically be given a new trial. The jury did not
reconvene to amend the verdict until three days later, and the test proposes
it must be brought back within one day. For the purpose of this Article,
however, each juror’s behavior after the discharge will be analyzed under
the proposed test.
Juror one’s witness of a spectator crying post-verdict would likely be
considered prejudicial, but on its own it likely would not be enough to
outweigh the burden of starting a new trial. Juror two, based on the
questionnaire, would know that even Mrs. Smith’s comment “shame on
you” is considered conversation for purposes of the prejudice analyses,
whereas under the Dietz guidance the juror may not have. The judge
would likely determine that this is highly prejudicial, especially because
it was a comment said by the decedent’s mother. That particular comment
would be perhaps most prejudicial coming from her, rather than any other
spectator in the courtroom that day. Similarly, juror three will have noted
on the questionnaire his texts with his wife. The judge will likely find that
the conversation is highly prejudicial because the wife’s comment is
validating, which is one of the exact reasons conversations about the trial
can be dangerous. Jurors four and five would have answered on the
questionnaire that they had accessed and researched what would now be
extrinsic evidence if they were to be asked to decide again on the same
case. These actions alone would be enough for the judge to decide to issue
a new trial because, under the proposed test, any extrinsic evidence looked

prolonged. Id. Thus, judges are more involved from the beginning and would not be likely to grant a
new trial in this new form of discretion offered in recalling discharged juries. If judges are not in
charge of their own case management and instead give that job to a magistrate, then that judge may
be criticized for doing so because it violates the “single judge” rule of the Civil Caseflow Management
Guidelines. Id. at 694-95.
162. See Cravens, supra note 4, at 948.
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into about the case is considered so prejudicial that it is automatic grounds
for a new trial.
The conversation between jurors six and seven would be noted on
the questionnaire since talking to other jurors outside of the deliberation
room about the case can also amount to prejudice. Here, however, the
judge would likely determine that general comments about being glad the
case is over have no actual taint on the jurors. Lastly, juror eight’s
Facebook comment itself may not rise to the level of prejudice, but since
there were several comments left by others responding to it, the judge
would need to inquire about what those comments were and whether the
juror had read them while discharged.
The judge deciding whether to recall the jury from Walter Smith’s
case would have all of this information gathered from the jurors’
questionnaires and would then weigh it all against the burdens of starting
a new trial in that same court. The amount of prejudice in this case would
have been substantial enough to outweigh the burdens of having a new
trial, and therefore a new trial should be rendered. Multiple jurors
experienced prejudice so that the fate of Walter Smith’s case should no
longer rest in the hands of that very same jury. The costs and lack of
finality that come with starting a new trial are not ideal for any claimant
to have to endure, but in this case it would be worth it so that the verdict
and amount of damages is not unfairly amended.
D.

Post-Verdict Motions and Party Objections

Another significant aspect that the Supreme Court test fails to
address is the implication of post-verdict motions and party objections. 163
Because there is no timeline from the decision indicating “how long is too
long” for the jury to be discharged and still be considered for a recall,
there is nothing stopping a party from requesting, perhaps days later, that
the judge re-empanel the jury to fix the flawed verdict. A party negatively
impacted by the flawed verdict may first try this route rather than file a
motion for a new trial. Parties have 28 days to file a motion for a new trial
or for an amendment to the verdict, 164 so what is stopping a party from,
prior to seeking a new trial, taking nearly 28 days to request to recall the
original jury? Without a strict time-frame issued under Dietz, district
courts may grant the request and recall the original jurors who would have
had more than enough time and opportunity to be prejudiced in a number
163. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at *38-39.
164. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(b) & (e). The court can order a new trial by granting a party’s motion,
or it can grant a new trial for reasons other than what is stated in the party’s own motion. Id.
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of ways. The balancing test proposed above prohibits this from happening
because the time-frame to recall the jury is one day only. Other federal
rules indicate that parties can identify and correct errors, but it must
happen while the jury is still empaneled. 165
Typically, a party that fails to object to an inconsistent verdict before
the jury is excused waives its right to make any future objections on the
verdict. 166 The rationale for the rule is that the party did not object when
it had a chance to have the original jury head back into the deliberation
room and amend the verdict, or even have the judge further instruct the
jury. However, under the Dietz test this notion becomes futile. If the judge
can always re-empanel the same jury whose verdict is inconsistent, then
objecting is not necessary. 167 On the other hand, the party that wins with
the original verdict may want to object to the recall because it will be
unfavorable to them; in other words, the party who wins initially may be
better off with a new trial than with the same jury amending its verdict
after it has been recalled and received more instruction from the judge. 168
Because the Court’s opinion did not address the impact it will have on
other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, such as Rules 48, 49, 51, and 59,

165. See FED. R. CIV. P. (48)(c) (“After a verdict is returned but before the jury is discharged,
the court must on a party’s request, or may on its own, poll the jurors individually.”); FED. R. CIV. P.
51 (b)(3) (“The court may instruct the jury at any time before the jury is discharged.”); FED. R. CRIM.
P. 30(c) (“The court may instruct the jury before or after the arguments are completed, or at both
times.”); and FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(d) (“After a verdict is returned but before the jury is discharged, the
court must on a party’s request, or may on its own, poll the jurors individually.”).
166. See FED. R. CIV. P. 46. Unless the party had no chance to object, the right to object is
waived: “Failing to object does not prejudice a party who had no opportunity to do so when the ruling
or order was made.” Id. See Babcock v. General Motors Corp., 299 F.3d 60, 63-67 (1st Cir. 2002)
(“General Motors has waived any claim that the special verdict form was unacceptable by failing to
object at a time when I could have taken corrective action; and General Motors has waived any claim
that the verdicts are inconsistent because I gave it an opportunity to assert such a claim before I
discharged the jury and it declined to make its argument at a time when I could have taken corrective
action.”); see also Colonial Refrigerated Transp., Inc. v. Mitchell, 403 F.2d 541, 552 (5th Cir. 1968)
(“The burden was on the defendants’ counsel to make a timely request that the court properly limit
the admissibility to the evidence and properly charge the jury with respect to the manner in which it
was to be considered.”).
167. See FED. R. CIV. P. 46 (Notes & Decisions). There is a further issue here, however, about
what could happen on appeal in this case if the party did not object to the inconsistent verdict, and the
judge recalled the jury, and the verdict was not in that party’s favor. Yet, there is still a chance, albeit
a slim one, that the appellate court may bring an objection sua sponte if none was made by a party.
168. See R. B. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 299 F.2d 753, 760 (5th Cir. 1962) (“When so much of the
verdict is made up of answers which are not sustained by the evidence and the really critical issue on
increase of hazard was not submitted to the jury at all . . . the case must be retried.”); see also FED. R.
CIV. P. 49 (b)(4) (“When the answers are inconsistent with each other and one or more is also
inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment must not be entered; instead, the court must direct the
jury to further consider its answers and verdict, or must order a new trial.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 49 (Notes
& Decisions).
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the district courts will be left to figure out these dilemmas as they arise.
The sense of finality for claimants that the Court was defending in its
opinion is actually a false sense of finality because in reality there will
likely be more appeals due to this new power afforded to federal judges.
V. CONCLUSION
As this Article illustrates, judges are afforded far too much authority
in the precedent set forth in Dietz. The strategy that may have worked for
the facts of that particular case should not be set as the standard for all
federal judges to use when found in a situation of deciding whether to
recall a discharged jury to amend a flawed verdict. It is far too simplistic
of a test for it to fit all the various scenarios that could arise during the
time that the jury is discharged. Once jurors have removed their “juror
cap,” they are free from the court’s instruction and can act, think, and
speak as they please. Without stricter guidelines on how judges should
consider the concept of using the same jury, too many cases will be
amended by juries that have been prejudiced beyond repair. Issuing jurors
a questionnaire upon their recall will enhance the effectiveness of the
judge’s determination of whether or not there was prejudice during the
time the jury was discharged. By balancing that risk against the burdens
of starting a new trial in an era plagued with congested courts, the sanctity
of our judicial system will be preserved and will remain a reliable and
equitable function of our society as a whole.
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